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E L M A R  R I E G E R
University of Bremen, Germany
The Wondrous Politics of Global Ideas: A Comment
(elmar rieger is Associate Professor at the Centre for Social Policy, University of
Bremen, Germany)
Nothing appears more surprising to those, who consider human affairs with a
philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few;
and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and
passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is
effected, we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the
governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion
only that that government is founded . . . (Hume 1777/1985: 32)
Global ideas matter, local politics decide – if that is true, as the articles
presented here in the forum seem to indicate, what is it that makes global
ideas relevant but still leaves local politics in a pivotal position? Where do
ideas about ‘setting policies right’ come from and, more important still, where
do they get their power from? And why, to elaborate a little bit more on the
second question, is local politics in spite of shrinking distances and the end of
state-defining geography able to make a difference?
To answer the first question, perhaps the most important source of those
global ideas which are pushed to restructure the national institutions of
economic and social policy is the drive of the USA to globalize its own brand
of welfare capitalism in order to fend off alternatives. The more dominant US
companies became in the world economy, the greater the need to make sure
that this world economy is not a source of contending varieties of welfare
capitalism. But this is not just to expand commercial opportunities within a
framework of giving American policy formulas and legal institutions a
transnational reach. There is much more at stake: the principles of good
government established ‘from reflection and choice’.1 Because the SA is both
the ‘indispensable nation’ for globalization and its juggernaut, it is also the
most challenged by its centrifugal forces.
The runaway world created by globalization cuts across all boundaries of
geography and nationality, undermines organizations, institutions, and
identities: ‘The trial by market everything must come to’, as Robert Frost
pithily put it. In this sense, globalization can be said to unite all mankind. But
the relationships created by markets are too ephemeral to serve as foundations
for new forms of social organization – organizations strong enough to create
the solidarity necessary to burden its members with taxes. In some way or
another public needs have to be met. The trial by viable community that
everything must also come to. Thus, it is a paradoxical unity that globalization
brought about, a unity of disunity: it confronts every society and government
with disintegration and unending reform, there is no end to struggle and
contradiction, and ambiguity and dissension are constant features of our new
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moral economy. Like the first wave of economic globalization one and a half
centuries ago, the present globalization created a universe in which, as Marx
said, ‘all that is solid melts into air’. In other words, globalization threatens to
destroy not only everything we have, but also everything we are.
Globalization is not only about the economic integration of the world, but
also the spread of democracy. Democracy, however, or national self-
determination, is something not easily reconciled with one-world capitalism
because it always involves the cultivation of societal peculiarity. Democracy
superimposes society on the state and thus presupposes some kind of unity
that can also be called ‘culture’ (Rieger and Leibfried, 2004). The more fragile
this unity, the more it is challenged, the higher the probability that this unity
is achieved with the help of a legend of providential ‘mission’ (Weber, 1978:
925).
Because democracy has become the hegemonic norm of political
organization, and since in a democracy the passion for equality is always
stronger than the passion for freedom (Tocqueville), this peculiar
constellation of both the global spread of democracy and market capitalism is
indeed a threat to the USA as a viable community. James Madison, in his Notes
of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Madison, 1787/1987: 194)
describes the central problem of the peculiar American system:
We cannot however be regarded even at this time, as one homogenous mass, in
which every thing that affects a part will affect in the same manner the whole. In
framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we should not lose sight of the
changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of necessity
increase the proportion of those who will labor under all hardships of life, &
secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These may in time
outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. According to the
equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the former. No
agrarian attempts [i.e. land reform] have yet been made in this Country, but
symptoms, of a levelling spirit, as we have understood, have sufficiently appeared
in certain quarters to give notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be
guarded against on republican principles?
The solution to this problem is that the USA has become a ‘world trans-
forming society’ (Brzezinski, 2004). Its traditional source of cultural security,
geographical isolation, has disappeared as a result of new circumstances and
technologies. Since turning a European struggle for hegemony into the First
World War and making the metaphysical principles of a good society the bone
of international contention, Americans are remaking the world to resemble
themselves. If democracy and capitalism – in their peculiar American
amalgamation – spread throughout the world, security for the long-standing
American project of a new society could become automatic. This grand
strategy of American foreign policy won new urgency after 9/11, but is far
from new (Gaddis, 2004). ‘Regime change’ is not limited to Afghanistan and
Iraq, but a global strategy for quite some time, and the means to accomplish
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it is less strategic bombing but more the diplomatic apparatus of the State
Department and the Treasury engaged in ‘technical assistance’ and ‘capacity
building’. During the cold war, with the Soviet Union as a countervailing
centre of power, American leaders were forced, at least to a degree, to care
what the rest of the world thought, and framed their international strategy
accordingly. When this constraint disappeared, and the promise of ‘free’
cultural security for the USA, thanks to the irresistible – and irreversible –
movement towards democracy and capitalism did not get fulfilled, the new
formula was ‘Fukuyama plus force’ (Gaddis, 2004: 90).
The American politics of global ideas quite consciously – and most
notoriously in the form of the ‘Washington consensus’ of the World Bank –
try to create interests and structures in other countries that parallel those of
the USA, thus pre-empting any challenge to the American model both from
abroad and from the inside.2 The latter is achieved because domestic critics
have a hard time to point to any viable alternative, whereas the former means
the build-up of transnational networks of like-minded policy makers. Djelic’s
article on the globalization of the American competition regime in this issue
of GSP illustrates this general mechanism of the interplay between ideas and
interests.
The American globalization project is to remake the world in its own image
– but the world, more often than not, resists. Paradoxically, at least to the
American led globalization, the main reason for this is the very ‘democracy’
they try to promote. Democracy in the USA, however, is something quite
unique, in the sense that the federal constitution is a conscious attempt to
check democracy for the sake of freedom.3 It may well be that the American
values bolstering their globalization drive are ‘universal’, but a democratic
polity has always at its centre unique social structures. Without cultural
autonomy democracy would be an empty shell. Domestically, the institutional
infrastructure that a globalized market economy with highly mobile capital
necessitates is subject to electoral politics. Social, economic and financial
regulation, the management of foreign trade relations and competition
regimes is still placed in the political arena, where one-person-one-vote rules.
In addition, it is quite obvious that the economic problems posed by global-
ization are symptoms of unanswered social, cultural and political questions.
With this discourse, democracy does make a difference in order to be
legitimate. Democratic government is popular government. When majorities
of people perceive themselves to be threatened by globalization they ask
questions as if their answer would determine the future of popular
government ‘by and for the people’ (Rieger and Leibfried, 2003).
Thus, the inevitable refraction of global ideas through local politics – and
perhaps an answer to the second question. National politicians have to take
care of exclusively national voters, and since economic globalization means
both the destruction and the creation of economic opportunities every
election turns into a referendum into what to accept from globalization under
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what condition – and what not. Ganghof’s article on changes in the tax state
shows both the direct effect and the limits to the international tax competition
induced by the new freedoms of capital. Because welfare states are well
entrenched, politicians are forced to cultivate its tax base. The different fate
of corporate and personal income taxation – or the mercantilist privileging of
capital – in the last two decades, reflects the increased power of the mobile
factors of production and thus a shift of the tax burden to the immobile
groups.4
The rise of global ‘epistemic communities’, which form part of the
infrastructure of globalization is by itself a product of the democratic
global–local mismatch. The transnational networks of central banks, antitrust
authorities and financial regulators are in a way a reflection of the power of
democracy.5 Cross-country alliances of these interests being unified are
attempts to compensate for their domestic weakness – their lack in numbers
in one-person-one-vote systems geared towards majority interests. To
strengthen competitive markets, to deregulate labour markets and to use
private institutions for the production of public goods, to give private capital
a stake (and profits) in pension and health care systems – all this is quite
impossible in a democratic polity with its natural bias towards social
democracy. The European integration project of a single market could
succeed because of its basically supranational format, i.e. eliminating the voice
of national parliaments in both the creation and the governance of the
‘common market’. It is not by accident that, as can be learned from Ervik’s
article in this issue, the most liberal (in the European sense of the word)
reform ideas are voiced in international organizations several steps removed
from national parliaments and without representative institutions. For this
reason the two Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the World Bank,
come up with essentially American blueprints for social policy reforms, and
the ILO, with its corporatist set-up an essentially European creation, tries to
defend the welfare state formulas of social democracy.6
‘The great cold calculated story’ (Henry James) of American success and its
transformation into a salvation religion for the whole world is a default
condition. The basically American faith in the moral weight and the healing
power of economic theory is a function of the American political constitution
that makes it extremely difficult to harness state power to welfare state goals.
In the USA, not the people but the constitution is sovereign. Hence, by
default, the drive to exploit the socialist potential of competitive markets, the
need to harness the private institutions of capitalism to the realization of
public goods, and the evocation of consumer socialism as the American
version of the welfare statism that is a correlate of democratic political
systems.7 Whereas in Europe the political adjustment of rights and
obligations was used to produce a countervailing system to the distribution of
positive and negative privilege by the blind forces of the market, in the USA
the operations of the market are used to adjust rights and obligations.8
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notes
1. This phrase is from Alexander Hamilton in his Federalist Paper No. 1, where he
states that ‘it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their
conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men
are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political
constitutions on accident and force’ (Madison et al., 1788/1987: 87).
2. On the rise (and, perhaps, the imminent fall) of the set of ideas branded as
‘Washington consensus’ (see Naim, 1999). The notion that the American
approach to financial, economic and social regulation is essentially uncontested,
both domestically and internationally, informs most work on ‘transgovernmental
relations’ (Keohane and Nye, 1974), American ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2004) or a ‘new
world order of government networks’ (Slaughter, 2004). Slaughter flatly states
that ‘where a U.S. regulatory, judicial, or legislative approach is dominant, it is
likely to be powerful through attraction rather than coercion – exactly the kind of
soft power that Joseph Nye has been exhorting the United States to use. This
attraction flows from expertise, integrity, competence, creativity, and generosity
with time and ideas – all characteristics that U.S. regulators, judges, and legis-
lators have exhibited with their foreign counterparts’ (Slaughter, 2004: 5). To
deny that the ideas that inform regulatory approaches are contested is, of course,
a political statement. James Madison would agree. In his Federalist Paper No. 10
he argues that ‘as long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty
to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists
between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a
reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will object to which the latter
will attach themselves. . . . The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature
of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity,
according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different
opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as
well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions
whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn,
divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered
them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for
their common good’ (Madison et al., 1788/1987: 123, 124).
3. Zakaria (2003: 17) makes the same point when he argues that the American
system ‘might be termed “constitutional liberalism” ’ and that it has ‘nothing
intrinsically to do with democracy and the two have not always gone together,
even in the West’.
4. This is by no means a new phenomenon, nor does it contradict the substance of
democracy, as can be learned from Weber (1978: 352), describing the situation in
the decade before the First World War: ‘Even where the propertyless strata are
dominant, the taxation of personal property meets certain limits, as long as the
propertied can freely leave the community. . . . If propertied families leave a
community, those staying behind must pay more taxes; and in a community
dependent on the market economy, and particularly a market economy, the have-
nots may find their economic opportunities so much reduced that they will
abandon any reckless attempt at taxing the haves or will even deliberately favor
them. . . . Thus, even where the have-nots are in control, personal property may
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either expect mercantilist privileges or at least exemption from . . . taxes, provided
a plurality of communities competes with one another among which the property
owners can chose their domicile.’
5. Deacon’s article in this issue shows a learning process in the sense that the
promotion of universalistic forms of social policy in international organizations
mimics the success of the neoliberal revolution ‘from above’. Of course, there is
no absolute judgement possible in ‘setting policies right’. When Deacon argues
that there seems to be a shift underway from means-tested programmes to
universal programmes – and marks this as progress – then this thinking is clearly
linked to notions of social policy that have a strong cultural bias.
6. See, for example, the Declaration of Philadelphia from 1944 ‘on the aims and
purposes of the International Labour Organization and of the principles which
should inspire the policy of its Members’, which is a formal part of the ‘consti-
tution’ of the ILO. The Declaration (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/
iloconst.htm#annex) states as the first ‘fundamental principle on which this
organization is based’ that ‘labour is not a commodity’, thus defining social and
economic security as ‘decommodification’.
7. For two historical studies making a similar point see Sklar (1988) and Livingston
(1997).
8. This was first recognized by the American economist John Bates Clark in 1887
and is still relevant today (Livingston, 1997: 43).
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S V E N  E . O .  H O RT
Södertörn University College, Sweden
The Geography of Comparative Welfare State Research: 
A Comment
(sven e. o. hort is Professor of Sociology at Södertörn University College in
Stockholm, Sweden)
In 2004, the United Nations (UN) had 191 member-states. Far from all of
them would be labelled welfare states, although many of them pretend to
belong to that category. When Harold Wilensky (1975) pioneered compar-
ative welfare state research some 40 years ago, his sample from 1966 consisted
of 64 countries at a time when the UN had 119 member-states. However, his
analysis focused on the 22 most developed welfare states (see also Wilensky,
2002). And so it has been, until recently.
Wilensky’s sample included the core West European countries, Israel,
Canada and the USA in North America, three East European countries
(Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary), Australia and New Zealand in the
Pacific. Japan was number 23 on the list. Thus, this was the geography of
advanced welfare states on the globe – minus Japan (Wilensky 1975). In
analytical terms, Wilensky made a distinction between four types of welfare
states: liberal democratic, totalitarian, authoritarian oligarchic, and author-
itarian populist. In 1990, when Gösta Esping-Andersen published The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, a work that in many ways summarized the
research that had followed in the tracks of Wilensky, his sample had shrunk to
18 countries: Japan was included, Israel was gone and, most important, the
East European countries had disappeared. The three ‘worlds’ made up the
combined world of advanced capitalism and liberal democracy. Thus,
democracy, or Western state- and nation-building more generally, had
become a key indicator in the selection of research objects although also the
decline in social development should not be forgotten. Nevertheless, it is
probably too early to forget the various forms of authoritarian welfare states
that hitherto have existed.
Since the early 1990s, the geography of comparative welfare state research
has changed dramatically. Hence, globalization, and in particular global
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